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Act vs. Amendment: Schultz Family Farms, Legislative 
Exceptions, and the Future of Right-To-Farm 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 America was built on family farms, and in the last several decades 
many states have moved to protect those farms. All fifty states have a 
right-to-farm act of some sort that protects the right of citizens to farm 
their land. Recently, some states have gone further and added right-to-
farm amendments to their state constitutions. As shown in Schultz Family 
Farms LLC v. Jackson Cty., right-to-farm acts allow states to make 
exceptions where necessary. Because right-to-farm amendments are so 
new, it is too soon to tell exactly what effect they will have. However, 
based on the effects of other constitutional amendments, it is likely that it 
will prove much harder for states to add necessary exceptions to right-to-
farm amendments. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
 The Schultz Family Farms LLC, James Frink and Marilyn Frink, 
and Frink Family Trust (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are Jackson County 
commercial farmers who grow and have currently planted Roundup 
 3 
ReadyTM Alfalfa grown from genetically engineered seeds.1 Plaintiffs are 
challenging Proposed Jackson County Ordinance 635 (hereinafter “the 
Ordinance” or “Ordinance 635”), which would ban the growth of 
genetically engineered crops Jackson County, Oregon.2 The Ordinance 
was passed as a ballot measure by Jackson County voters on May 20, 
2014, and was intended to go into effect on June 1, 2015.3  
 Plaintiffs alleged that Ordinance 635 conflicts with Oregon's Right 
to Farm Act (“the Act”) and would force them to destroy already-planted 
crops without just compensation.4 They sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief to “permanently enjoin enforcement of the ordinance,” or, in the 
alternative, damages for the ordinance's forced destruction of their crops.5 
Defendant alleges that Ordinance 635 is in compliance with the Act and 
meets an exception under Senate Bill 863.6 
 The Act provides that “[a]ny local government . . . ordinance . . . 
that makes a farm practice a nuisance or trespass...is invalid with respect 
                                                 
1 Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson Cty. (hereafter “Schultz”), No. 1:14-CV-01975, 
2015 WL 3448069, at *1 (D. Or. May 29, 2015). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-947 (2015). 
5 Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069, at *1. 
6 Id. 
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to that farm practice.”7 A farm practice includes modes of operation used 
on farms of a similar nature and generally accepted, reasonable, or prudent 
methods by which a farm can make a profit.8 A nuisance or trespass 
includes actions based on “noise, vibration, odors, smoke, dust, mist from 
irrigation, use of pesticides and use of crop production substances.”9 
 The text and context of Oregon's Right to Farm Act show that the 
legislature meant to protect farms and farming practices from urban 
encroachment.10 The Act contains an exception allowing claims or 
ordinances “based on farming practices that cause 'damage to commercial 
agricultur[e].'”11 The Act prevents urban and suburban interference with 
farming, but still allows commercial farmers recourse in the form of suit 
when their crops are being damaged by other farmers.12 
 Jackson County Ordinance 635 makes it illegal “'for any person or 
entity to propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically engineered plants 
within Jackson County.'”13 Genetic engineering means any “'modification 
                                                 
7 Id. at *3; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015).  
8 Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069, at *3; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.930(2) (2015). 
9 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2015)). 
10 Id. at *4. 
11 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015)). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. (quoting JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.04). 
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of living plants and organisms by genetic engineering, altering or 
amending DNA using recombinant DNA technology such as gene 
deletion, gene doubling, introducing a foreign gene, or changing the 
position of genes, and includes cell fusion.'”14 The purpose of the 
Ordinance is “to protect local farmers from 'significant economic harm to 
organic farmers and to other farmers who choose to grow non-genetically 
engineered crops' that can be caused by 'genetic drift' from [genetically 
engineered] crops.”15 Protecting local farmers fits within the commercial 
crop damage exception to Oregon’s Right to Farm Act.16 
 Oregon Senate Bill 863 made it illegal for local governments “'to 
inhibit or prevent the production or use of agricultural seed.'”17 However, 
the bill contained an exception for local measures “'[p]roposed by 
initiative petition and, on or before January 21, 2013, qualified for 
placement on the ballot in a county; and... [a]pproved by the electors of 
the county at an election held on May 20, 2014.'”18 The legislative history 
shows that this exception was created specifically to allow Ordinance 
                                                 
14 Id. (quoting JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.03). 
15 Id. (quoting JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.02(c)). 
16 Id. at *5. 
17 Id. (quoting Act of 2013, Or. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1, 2 (2013)); see also OR. REV. 
STAT. § 637.738(2) (2015). 
18 Id. (quoting S.B. 863 § 4, 77th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2013)). 
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635.19 
 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held 
that Jackson County Ordinance 635 is valid under the Right to Farm Act 
and specifically authorized by Oregon law.20 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Right-to-Farm Acts: Oregon 
Right-to-farm acts such as the one at issue in Schultz are not new.21 
All fifty states have enacted some form of right-to-farm act, and most 
right-to-farm acts contain similar provisions.22 These provisions generally 
                                                 
19 Id. at *6; for more discussion of the legislative history at issue in Schultz, see infra 
LEGAL BACKGROUND. 
20 Id. 
21 Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: 
Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 119 
(1983). One of the first right-to-farm statutes was enacted in North Carolina in 1979. Id. 
22 Rusty Rumley, A Comparison of the General Provisions Found in Right-to-Farm 
Statutes, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 328-29 (2011); see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (2015); 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.235 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 3-111, 3-112 (2015); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-101-2-4-108 (2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5 (2015); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 35-3.5-101-35-3.5-103 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-341 (2015); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1401 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 823.14 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 
(2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 165-1-165-6 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 22-4501-22-4504 
(2015); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/0.01-70/5 (2015); IND. CODE §§ 32-30-6-1-32-30-6-1.5, 
32-30-6-9, 32-30-6-11 (2015); IOWA CODE §§ 352.1-352.12 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
2-3201-2-3205 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
3:3601-3:3624 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 151-161 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 243, § 6, ch. 128, § 1A (2015); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 286.471-286.474 (2015); MINN. STAT. § 561.19 (2015); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
27-30-101, 45-8-11 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4401-2-4404 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. 
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include policy statements, definition sections, limits on protected actions, 
and prohibitions against local government restrictions, among other 
things.23 
 Schultz is the first Oregon case to address whether local restrictions 
on agricultural practices violate the state’s right-to-farm laws.24 Under 
Oregon law, courts must look to legislative intent in interpreting a statute, 
including pertinent legislative history.25 In deciding Schultz and the fate of 
Ordinance 635, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon looked 
primarily to the legislative history surrounding the laws in question: 
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act and Senate Bill 863.26 
                                                                                                                         
§ 40-140 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432:32-432:35 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
4:1C-1-4:1C-10.4 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-9-1-47-9-7 (2015); N.Y. AGRIC. & 
MKTS. §§ 300-310 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700-106-701 (2015); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 42-04-01-42-04-05 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 929.01-929.05, 3767.13 
(2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 1-1.1 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015); 3 
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-955 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-23-1-2-23-7 (2015); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 46-45-10-46-45-80 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-10-25.1-21-10-
25.6 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-26-101-43-26-104 (2015); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 251.001-251.006 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-41-401-17-41-403 (2015); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5751-5754 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.2-300-3.2-302 (2015); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.300-7.48.320 (2015); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-19-1-19-19-6 
(2015); WIS. STAT. § 823.08 (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-44-101-11-44-103 (2015). 
23 Rumley, supra note 22, at 329. 
24 Based on the number of citations to OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015) 
(specifically OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015)). 
25 Schultz., 2015 WL 3448069, at *3. 
26 Id. at *3-6; for more discussion of the legislative history at issue in Schultz, see infra 
INSTANT DECISION. 
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 Oregon has a long history of protecting its environmental resources 
– farmland included.27 The state first codified its agricultural policy in 
1973.28 According to Oregon law, the preservation of agricultural land is 
important, not just because of agriculture’s role in the state’s economy, but 
also because it is a practical way to preserve natural resources.29 “The 
preservation of a maximum amount of the limited supply of agricultural 
land is necessary to the conservation of the state's economic resources and 
the preservation of such land in large blocks is necessary in maintaining 
the agricultural economy of the state . . . .”30 The codified policy also 
states that protecting agricultural land is “an efficient means of conserving 
natural resources that constitute an important physical, social, aesthetic 
and economic asset to all of the people of this state.”31 The 1973 policy 
statement also sought to protect agricultural land from encroachment by 
those who would use it for nonagricultural purposes: “[e]xpansion of 
urban development into rural areas is a matter of public concern because 
of the unnecessary increases in costs of community services, conflicts 
                                                 
27 Owen J. Furuseth, The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program: A Review and 
Assessment, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 603, 603 (1980). 
28 OR. REV. STAT. § 215.243 (2015). 
29 Id. 
30 § 215.243(2). 
31 § 215.243(1). 
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between farm and urban activities and the loss of open space and natural 
beauty around urban centers occurring as the result of such expansion.”32 
The Act was first passed in 1993.33 In part, it echoes the earlier 
codification of agricultural policy.34 Among other things, the Act states 
that 
[f]arming and forest practices are critical to the economic 
welfare of this state… [t]he expansion of residential and 
urban uses on and near lands zoned or used for agriculture 
or production of forest products may give rise to conflicts 
between resource and nonresource activities… [f]arming 
practices on lands zoned for farm use must be protected… 
[p]ersons who locate on or near an area zoned for farm or 
forest use must accept the conditions commonly associated 
with living in that particular setting.35 
 
Like the 1973 policy codification, the Act protects agricultural land 
use and protects agricultural land from complaints by nonagricultural 
neighbors.36 Oregon updated the Act in 1995 and again in 2001.37 
The Act ultimately prohibits nuisance or trespass claims against 
any “farming… practice on lands zoned for farm . . . use . . . .”38 The Act 
                                                 
32 § 215.243(3) (emphasis added). 
33 Oregon. Department of Agriculture, Oregon’s Right to Farm Law, (May 2014), 
http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/shared/Documents/Publications/NaturalResources/RightTo
Farm.pdf. 
34 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015). 
35 §§ 30.933(1)(a)-(b), (2)(a), (2)(c). 
36 §§ 215.243, 30.933, 30.936. 
37 Oregon’s Right to Farm Law, supra note 33, at 1. 
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also prohibits nuisance or trespass claims against any “farming . . . 
practice allowed as a preexisting nonconforming use . . . .”39 Further, the 
Act invalidates “[a]ny local government or special district ordinance or 
regulation now in effect or subsequently adopted that makes a farm 
practice a nuisance or trespass or provides for its abatement as a nuisance 
or trespass . . . .”40 “Nuisance or trespass” includes “claims based on noise, 
vibration, odors, smoke, dust, mist from irrigation, use of pesticides and 
use of crop production substances.”41 However, there are some narrow 
exceptions to these protections.42 
The Act defines a “farm” as “any facility, including the land, 
buildings, watercourses and appurtenances thereto, used in the commercial 
production of crops, nursery stock, livestock, poultry, livestock products, 
poultry products, vermiculture products or the propagation and raising of 
nursery stock.”43 The Act defines a “farming practice” as  
a mode of operation on a farm that… [i]s or may be used 
on a farm of a similar nature . . . [i]s a generally accepted, 
reasonable and prudent method for the operation of the 
                                                                                                                         
38 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.936(1) (2015). 
39 § 30.937(1). 
40 § 30.935. 
41 § 30.932. 
42 §§ 30.936(2), 30.937(2). 
43 § 30.930(1). 
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farm to obtain a profit in money . . . [i]s or may become a 
generally accepted, reasonable and prudent method in 
conjunction with farm use . . . [c]omplies with applicable 
laws; and . . . [i]s done in a reasonable and prudent 
manner.44 
 
The Act also considers “the transport or movement of any 
equipment, device or vehicle used in conjunction with a farming practice . 
. . on a public road or movement of livestock on a public road” to be a 
farming practice.45 Additionally, the Act considers pesticide use to be a 
farming practice, so long as the pesticide:  
[i]s or may be used on a farm of a similar nature . . . [i]s a 
reasonable and prudent method for the operation of the 
farm to obtain a profit in money . . . [i]s or may become 
customarily utilized in conjunction with farm use . . . 
[c]omplies with applicable laws; and . . . [i]s done in a 
reasonable and prudent manner.46 
As noted above, there are some narrow exceptions to the Act.47 
It does not apply to claims for “[d]eath or serious physical injury . . 
. .”48 More relevant to Schultz, it does not apply to claims for “[d]amage to 
commercial agricultural products.”49 
                                                 
44 § 30.930(2). 
45 § 30.931. 
46 § 30.939(1). 
47 §§ 30.936(2), 30.937(2). 
48 §§ 30.936(2)(b), 30.937(2)(b). 
49 §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a). 
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Few prior Oregon courts have had reason to interpret the Act.50 In 
one case, a court held that the Act’s protection of farming practices 
extends to barking dogs.51 The defendant in that case owned a herd of 
goats and used the dog in question to guard her livestock.52 One of the 
ways in which the dog guarded the livestock was by barking at predators 
to scare the predators away or to summon a farmer.53 Because there was 
evidence that this was a reasonable farming practice, the court held the 
Act applied and the dog’s barking was protected.54 Some states have gone 
even further in creating legal protections for farmers and added right-to-
farm amendments to their state constitutions.55 However, to date, Oregon 
has made no attempt to pass such an amendment. 
 
 
                                                 
50 Based on the number of citations to OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015). Only six 
other cases have referenced the relevant sections of Oregon’s Right to Farm Act; see 
Ream v. Keen, 838 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1992); Linn v. Pitts, 858 P.2d 1352 (Or. Ct. App. 
1993); Mark v. State Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Hood 
River Cty. v. Mazzara, 89 P.3d 1195 (Or. Ct. App. 2004); Hale v. State, 314 P.3d 345 
(Or. Ct. App. 2013); Schoenheit v. Rosenblum, 345 P.3d 436 (Or. 2015). 
51 Hood River, 89 P.3d at 1196. 
52 Id. at 1197. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1199. 
55 Brandon Kiley, Missouri Voters Pass ‘Right to Farm’ Amendment by Slim Margin, 
KBIA, (Aug. 6, 2014), http://kbia.org/post/missouri-voters-pass-right-farm-amendment-
slim-margin; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 35; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29. 
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B. Right-to-Farm Amendments: Missouri and North Dakota 
Some states have not been content with right-to-farm acts and have 
recently amended their constitutions to protect their respective citizens’ 
right to farm.56 In 2012, North Dakota was the first state to move beyond 
right-to-farm statutes and create a constitutional right to farm.57 Missouri 
voters approved a similar constitutional amendment in 2014.58 Both 
Indiana and Oklahoma have considered, but not passed, their own right-to-
farm amendments.59 
North Dakota’s right-to-farm amendment ensures that “[t]he right 
of farmers and ranchers to engage in modern farming and ranching 
practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state. No law shall be enacted 
which abridges the right of farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural 
                                                 
56 Brooke Jarvis, A Constitutional Right to Industrial Farming?, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-09/industrial-farming-state-
constitutional-amendments-may-give-legal-shield. 
57 Id.; see also N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29. 
58 Kiley, supra note 55; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
59 Jarvis, supra note 56; see also S.J. Res. 12, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2015) (right-to-farm amendment ultimately rejected) and H.J. Res. 1012, 55th Leg., 1st 
Sess. (Ok. 2015) (right-to-farm amendment passed and awaiting approval or rejection by 
a vote of the people of Oklahoma). 
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technology, modern livestock production, and ranching practices.”60 This 
amendment does not include any specific exceptions.61  
North Dakota’s earlier right-to-farm act, enacted in 1981, 
prevented individuals from bringing nuisance suits against farms 
(described in the act as “agricultural operations”) for “any changed 
conditions in or about the locality of such operation after it has been in 
operation for more than one year, if such operation was not a nuisance at 
the time the operation began . . . .”62 The act also contained several 
exceptions, including an exception for nuisances “result[ing] from the 
negligent or improper operation” of a farm.63 Under North Dakota’s act, 
individuals could still bring nuisance suits to “recover damages for any 
injury or damage sustained by the person on account of any pollution of or 
change in the condition of the waters of any stream or on account of any 
overflow of lands of any such person.”64 Like the Oregon right-to-farm act 
at issue in Schultz, the North Dakota act voided all local government 
                                                 
60 N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29. 
61 Id. 
62 N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-02 (2015). 
63 Id. 
64 § 42-04-03. 
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ordinances that allowed nuisance suits against farms (unless the 
ordinances met the above exceptions).65 
Nearly 35 years after the statute’s enactment, only a handful of 
reported cases have interpreted North Dakota’s right-to-farm act.66 One 
court held the act’s plain language created an exception and allowed 
nuisance suits against farmers who negligently or improperly operated 
their farms.67 Another court held the act’s “agricultural operation” 
definition included corporations involved in preparing or marketing 
agricultural products.68 
Similarly, Missouri’s right-to-farm amendment provides that the 
“right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices 
shall be forever guaranteed in this state . . . .”69 Missouri’s amendment 
specifically protects “agriculture which provides food, energy, health 
                                                 
65 § 42-04-04. 
66 Based on the number of citations to N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01, 42-04-05 (2015). 
Only five North Dakota cases have referenced the right-to-farm act; see Jerry Harmon 
Motors, Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n, 337 N.W.2d 427, 429 (N.D. 1983); 
Knoff v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 315-16 (N.D. 1986); Hebron Pub. Sch. 
Dist. No. 13 of Morton Cty. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 475 N.W.2d 120, 126 (N.D. 1991); 
State v. Hafner, 587 N.W.2d 177, 183 (N.D. 1998); Tibert v. Slominski, 692 NW.2d 133, 
136-37 (N.D. 2005). 
67 Hafner, 587 N.W.2d at 183. 
68 Tibert, 692 N.W.2d at 136-37. 
69 MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
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benefits, and security” because such agriculture is “the foundation and 
stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.”70 Missouri’s amendment does 
not include any specific exceptions.71  
Missouri’s earlier right-to-farm act, enacted in 1982 and amended 
in 1990, provides that “[n]o agricultural operation . . . shall be deemed to 
be a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in the locality 
thereof after the facility has been in operation for more than one year, 
when the facility was not a nuisance at the time the operation began.”72 
Missouri’s act contained several exceptions, including a requirement that 
farming practices comply with “all county, state, and federal 
environmental codes, laws, or regulations” in order to be protected by the 
act.73 Another exception protected reasonable farm expansion “provided 
the expansion does not create a substantially adverse effect upon the 
environment or creat[e] a hazard to public health and safety, or creat[e] a 
measurably significant difference in environmental pressures upon 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295(1) (2000). 
73 Id. 
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existing and surrounding neighbors because of increased pollution.”74 A 
specific exception for farms with poultry or livestock required that “waste 
handling capabilities and facilities meet or exceed minimum 
recommendations of the University of Missouri extension service for 
storage, processing, or removal of animal waste” in order for the farm to 
fall under the act’s protection.75 Like North Dakota’s act, Missouri’s act 
allowed individuals “to recover damages for any injuries sustained . . . as a 
result of the pollution or other change in the quantity or quality of water 
used . . .  or as a result of any overflow of land . . . .”76 Finally, the 
Missouri act contained an exception for farms “located within the limits of 
any city, town or village.”77 Nearly 35 years after the statute’s enactment, 
there are no reported cases interpreting Missouri’s right-to-farm act.78 
 Because right-to-farm amendments are a relatively new 
phenomenon, their limitations are still being tested in court. As of 2015, 
no reported cases have challenged the North Dakota amendment. In 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 § 537.295(3). 
77 § 537.295(4). 
78 Based on the number of citations to MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2015). Only one 
Missouri case has referenced the right-to-farm act; see Perryville v. Brewer, 376 S.W. 3d 
691 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
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Missouri, one recent lawsuit claimed the right-to-farm amendment 
protects citizens’ right to farm marijuana.79 Lisa Loesch was charged with 
felony manufacturing or distributing of a controlled substance in 2013 
after Missouri authorities found marijuana plants in her basement.80 
Loesch’s attorney argued that she was protected by Missouri’s new right-
to-farm amendment because the amendment prohibited legislators from 
telling farmers what they can and cannot grow.81 The court ultimately 
rejected this argument, with the judge reportedly saying only “traditional 
farming and ranching” practices were protected by the amendment.82 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
ultimately held that Jackson County Ordinance 635 did not violate 
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act.83 When interpreting Oregon law, federal 
                                                 
79 Associated Press, Judge: Missouri Right-to-Farm Doesn’t Cover Growing Weed, 
KOMU (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.komu.com/news/judge-missouri-right-to-farm-
doesn-t-cover-growing-weed/ (because Missouri trial courts do not publish their opinions, 
no case citation is available). 
80 Joel Currier, Does Missouri’s ‘Right-to-Farm’ Amendment Mean You Can Grow 




82 Associated Press, supra note 79. 
83 Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson Cty., No. 1:14-cv-01975, 2015 WL 3448069, at 
*2 (D. Or. May 29, 2015). 
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courts ought to interpret the law in the same manner as would the Oregon 
state courts.84 In Oregon, statutory interpretation looks to the legislature’s 
intent in enacting a statute.85 To determine legislative intent, the court 
looks first to the text and context of the statute, second to statements of 
statutory policy, third to pertinent legislative history, and last to general 
maxims of statutory construction.86 Statutory context includes both the 
immediate context within the statute itself and the broader context of other 
related statutes.87 
 Oregon’s Right to Farm Act states local governmental units’ 
current and future regulations and ordinances that “‘mak[e] a farm practice 
a nuisance or trespass . . . [are] invalid with respect to that farm practice 
for which no action or claim is allowed’” under other Oregon statutes.88 
Other Oregon statutes disallow nuisance and trespass claims for “‘farming 
or forest practice(s) on lands zoned for farm or forest’” and “‘farming or 
forest practice(s) allowed as a preexisting nonconforming use.’”89 Both of 
these statutes create exceptions for “‘damage to commercial agricultural 
                                                 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at *3. 
87 Id.at *2 (quoting State v. Stamper, 197 Or.App. 413, 417–18 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)). 
88 Id. at 3 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015)). 
89 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936, 30.937 (2015)). 
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products.’”90 Nuisance and trespass include claims based on “‘use of crop 
production substances.’”91 
Included within the Act is a statement as to the legislative intent 
behind its enactment.92 Part of the intent was to protect farming practices 
and prevent urban sprawl from being detrimental to farmland.93 The 
Oregon legislature wanted to protect farming practices from new and 
unfriendly suburban neighbors.94 One intention was that “‘farming. . . 
practices must be protected from legal actions that may be intended to 
limit, or have the effect of limiting, farming . . . practices.’”95 The 
legislature also said that anyone who lives on or near land zoned for 
farming purposes “‘must accept the conditions commonly associated with 
living in that particular setting.’”96 Another intent was to limit the ability 
of private individuals to sue for and of local governments to declare 
certain farming practices nuisances or trespasses; such suits and 
declarations “‘must be limited because [they] are inconsistent with land 
                                                 
90 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015)). 
91 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2015)). 
92 Id. at *3-4; codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933 (2015). 
93 Id. at *4. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at *3 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933(2)(d) (2015)). 
96 Id. at *4 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.033(2)(c) (2015)). 
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use policies . . . and have adverse effects on the continuation of farming . . 
. practices.’”97 
 Based on these intentions, the court said the purpose of the Act 
was to “protect farms and farming practices from urban encroachment.”98 
Essentially, the court said urban and suburban sprawl create the so-called 
nuisance; when the farms were there first, the farms win.99  
The Act also included an exception the court found persuasive.100 
The exception allowed private suits and local government ordinances 
prohibiting farming practices that “cause ‘damage to commercial 
agriculture.’”101 Not all farming practices are protected – only those that 
are most likely to cause tension with non-farming neighbors are within the 
purview of the Act.102 Because of this commercial agricultural damage 
exception, the court said the Act did not give farmers free reign to use any 
and all farming practices they desired.103 
                                                 




101 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015)). 
102 Id. Non-protected practices include any that damage a neighboring farmer’s crops. Id. 
103 Id. 
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 Jackson County Ordinance 635 makes it illegal for “‘any person or 
entity to propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically engineered plants 
within Jackson County.’”104 According to the language of the ordinance, 
its purpose is to protect local organic farmers whose crops might be 
contaminated by genetic drift from genetically engineered crops (such as 
genetically engineered seeds or pollen).105 Because this purpose – 
protecting organic farmers’ crops from damage caused by other farmers – 
fits within the commercial agricultural damage exception to the Oregon 
Right to Farm Act, the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon held the ordinance was valid on its face.106  
 Plaintiffs argue there must be a showing of actionable damage in 
order to meet the exception, so because the ordinance is preventative in 
nature, it should not qualify.107 The court rejects this argument because the 
text and context of the Right to Farm Act do not suggest such a 
requirement.108  
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at *5. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at *4. 
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 The court also looked to the legislative history behind Senate Bill 
863 and determined the bill’s purpose was to prevent local governmental 
units from passing laws or ordinances that would make the production or 
use of certain types of seeds illegal.109 A portion of the bill stated that 
local government could not “‘inhibit or prevent the production or use of 
agricultural seed.’”110 However, in an uncodified section of the bill, the 
legislature said the bill did not apply to local government ordinances 
“‘[p]roposed by initiative petition and, on or before January 21, 2013, 
qualified for placement on the ballot in a county; and . . . [a]pproved by 
the electors of the county at an election held on May 20, 2014.’”111 This 
uncodified exception exactly matches the circumstances surrounding the 
passing of Jackson County Ordinance 635.112 The legislative history 
contains testimony from Oregon state senators and representatives stating 
that Jackson County – the county where Schultz Family Farms is located – 
has a unique geography that makes genetic drift a real threat to organic 
                                                 
109 Id. at *5. 
110 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 633.738(2) (2015)). 
111 Id. (quoting S.B. 863 § 4, 77th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2013)). 
112 Id. 
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farmers in the area.113 Oregon’s governor at the time, John Kitzhaber, also 
testified that the bill’s purpose was to prevent local bans on genetically 
modified seeds with the exception of the already-on-the-ballot Ordinance 
635.114 Because this exception clearly applied to the ordinance, the bill did 
not preempt the ordinance.115 
V. COMMENT 
 Right-to-farm acts are the best way to protect farms and farmers. 
Right-to-farm amendments are unnecessary and may even be detrimental. 
Right-to-farm acts allow for necessary exceptions; right-to-farm 
amendments will likely make such exceptions much harder to come by. 
Additionally, there are concerns about who will benefit the most from 
such amendments: small, local family farms or large, impersonal factory 
“farms.” 
 Schultz demonstrates the adaptability of right-to-farm acts.116 
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act prohibits “[a]ny local government . . . 
ordinance . . . that makes a farm practice a nuisance or trespass” and 
                                                 
113 Id. at *6. 
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115 Id. 
116 Id. at *5. 
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makes such an ordinance “invalid with respect to that farm practice.”117 
However, the Act is not without exception: farming practices that result in 
“damage to commercial agricultur[e]” are not protected by the Act.118 In 
Schultz, this exception allowed for a legislative carve-out in a bill that 
would have otherwise prevented local governments from regulating the 
types of seeds that farmers could and could not use.119 This carve-out – 
made possible by the expansive nature of the Act – gave local 
governments in Oregon the flexibility to protect organic farmers from 
cross-contamination by genetically modified seeds.120 Because the organic 
farms were commercial agricultural operations, the Act’s exception 
protected them from the harmful practices of other farmers. 
 Exceptions to constitutional amendments are much harder to come 
by. For the most part, states cannot legislate their way around 
constitutional amendments; when an amendment clashes with an act, the 
amendment generally wins. Schultz demonstrates the necessity of certain 
exceptions to right-to-farm acts. Jackson County is home to two groups of 
                                                 
117 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015). 
118 §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a). 
119 Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069 at *5-6; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 637.738(2) (2015) and 
S.B. 863 § 4, 77th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
120 Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069, at *4. 
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farmers: organic farmers and farmers who utilize genetically engineered 
(also called genetically modified) seeds.121 Genetically engineered crops 
pose a risk, through cross-pollination, to organic farmers.122 The cross-
pollination of genetically engineered and organic crops would leave 
organic farmers unable to receive the necessary certifications from the 
U.S. Dept. of Ag. to label their crops as organic.123 Here, the two groups 
of farmers utilized competing farming practices, both of which were 
otherwise legal.124 Without Jackson County Ordinance 635 and the 
Oregon Right to Farm Act exceptions that made it possible, the organic 
farmers would have no protection from the danger of cross-pollination 
posed by genetically engineered crops.125 
One farmer’s rights cannot always be exercised in harmony with 
those of a neighboring farmer.126 Legislatures must have the ability to 
create exceptions to protect farmers from each other, as well as from urban 
                                                 
121 Id. at *1. 
122 Id. (citing JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.02(c)). 
123 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Can GMOs Be Used in Organic Products?, NAT’L 
ORGANIC PROGRAM1 (May 2013), 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Can%20GMOs%20be%20Used.pdf. 
124 Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069, at *1 (if either set of farming practices had been illegal, 
defendants would have had to bring a different type of suit). 
125 Id. at *6. 
126 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015). 
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and suburban sprawl. Further, legislatures need to be able to create other 
exceptions as needed by the communities they represent. The Oregon, 
North Dakota, and Missouri acts each contain exceptions tailored to the 
needs of each state.127 These legislative exceptions are easier to enact 
when farming rights are protected by legislative act rather than 
constitutional amendment. 
Activists have criticized right-to-farm acts because, in addition to 
their rigid construction, they primarily benefit large, corporate factory 
farms.128 North Dakota’s Right-To-Farm amendment, enacted in 2014, 
specifically prohibits the enactment of laws that “abridg[e] the right of 
farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern livestock 
production, and ranching practices.”129 “Agricultural technology” and 
“modern livestock production” might seem innocuous. The phrases could 
simply protect the right of farmers to use modern tractors and fertility 
drugs – but they could easily be read to protect concentrated animal 
feeding operations (“CAFO”) and the complex drug regimens necessary to 
                                                 
127 See §§ 30.936(2), 30.937(2); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-02-42-04-03 (2015); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 537.295(1), (3), (4) (2000). 
128 Jarvis, supra note 56. 
129 N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29. 
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keep CAFO livestock healthy. Without judicial interpretation of the new 
North Dakota amendment, it is impossible to know exactly what the 
amendment protects.130 
Similarly, Missouri’s Right-To-Farm amendment states that the 
“right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices 
shall be forever guaranteed in this state.”131 The Missouri amendment does 
not specify how that right will be guaranteed.132 The amendment is so 
vague as to be almost meaningless. What are “farming and ranching 
practices”? How exactly will Missouri protect them? Additionally, while 
Missouri’s right-to-farm act included at least five exceptions of varying 
specificity, Missouri’s right-to-farm amendment does not include any.133 
Is there no longer a need for the exceptions listed in the act? While it is 
possible that the amendment will be interpreted using Missouri’s right-to-
farm statute as a guideline, without judicial interpretation – which could 
                                                 
130 As of this writing, no reported cases have even cited to N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29, let 
alone interpreted it. 
131 MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
132 Id. 
133 See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 537.295(1), (3), (4) (2000); MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
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take years – it is nearly impossible to determine what effects the 
amendment will actually have on Missouri farmers.134 
One of the only right-to-farm amendment test cases to date has 
been the Loesch marijuana cultivation case.135 A Missouri trial court said 
the amendment did not apply and dismissed Loesch’s case.136 Missouri’s 
right-to-farm amendment refers to “agriculture which provides food, 
energy, health benefits, and security” and, as Missouri allows only 
extremely limited medical marijuana use, none of those applied to 
Loesch’s crop.137 
Oregon will likely have to address a similar issue and decide 
whether medical and recreational marijuana – both legal in the state – are 
protected by the Right to Farm Act.138 In Jackson County, where Schultz 
upheld the ordinance aimed at protecting organic farmers from crop 
damage, many residents have complained about the smell associated with 
                                                 
134 See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000). 
135 Associated Press, supra note 79; based on the number of citations to MO. CONST. art. 
I, § 35 (only one reported case has cited to the amendment, and it dealt with the propriety 
of the ballot language prior to the amendment’s passing). 
136 Id. 
137 MO. CONST. art. I, § 35; Associated Press, supra note 79. 
138 Ted Shorack, Conflicts Over Medical Marijuana Grow Sites, THE BULLETIN (June 11, 
2015, 5:53AM),  http://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/3225310-151/medical-
marijuana-grow-sites-have-struggled-to-fit#. 
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marijuana growing operations.139 However, “odors” are included in the 
Oregon Right to Farm Act’s definition of prohibited nuisance claims.140 
Another Oregon county has considered using zoning laws to prevent 
marijuana from being grown on land zoned for agricultural use.141 If 
marijuana production is protected under the Act, such zoning laws would 
likely run afoul of the Act’s prohibition on local ordinances that make 
farming practices nuisances.142 
When many people hear the word “farm,” they picture an idyllic 
red barn, a yard full of cows, pigs, and chickens, maybe a garden full of 
multi-colored vegetables – in short, a family farm straight out of the Old 
MacDonald nursery rhyme.143 However, right-to-farm amendments protect 
all farms, not just the quaint ones.144 Opponents of right-to-farm 
amendments worry that the amendments could interfere with 
                                                 
139 Associated Press, Officials: Pot Farmers Have “Right to Farm,” THE BULLETIN (June 
26, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/2191799-151/officials-pot-
farmers-have-right-to-farm. 
140 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2015). 
141 Mateusz Perkowski, County Mulls Marijuana Farm Zone Exclusion, CAPITAL PRESS 
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142 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015). 
143 Many companies take advantage of this assumption in their marketing materials; for 
example, Farmland’s bacon packaging features the above-mentioned red barn and 
impossibly blue skies over endless green pastures. 
144 Neither North Dakota’s nor Missouri’s amendment restricts farm size or imposes 
ownership requirements. See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29; MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
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environmental and animal welfare regulations, which mostly affect large 
factory farms.145 The possibility that right-to-farm amendments like North 
Dakota and Missouri’s might protect CAFOs is troubling. CAFOs may 
pose health hazards to humans, animals, and the environment.146 With 
such dangerous potential, laws should equip the state government to put in 
place regulations to protect health, not prevent it from doing so. 
Further, right-to-farm amendments are simply unnecessary. As 
shown in Schultz, right-to-farm acts are fully capable of protecting 
farmers’ rights.147 Oregon, North Dakota, and Missouri’s right-to-farm 
acts allow for state-specific protections and exceptions.148 The two right-
to-farm amendments that have been enacted as of 2015 – in North Dakota 
and Missouri – are vague when compared to those same state’s prior right-
                                                 
145 Julie Bosman, Missouri Weighs Unusual Addition to Its Constitution: Right to Farm, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/us/missouri-
considers-adding-right-to-farm-to-state-constitution.html?_r=1. 
146 Amanda Belanger, A Holistic Solution for Antibiotic Resistance: Phasing Out Factory 
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to-farm acts.149 The amendments provide farmers with more confusion 
than protection. 
Few reported cases deal with right-to-farm laws. Only seven 
reported cases, including Schultz, cite to the relevant provisions of 
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act.150 In North Dakota, only five reported cases 
include citations to the relevant provisions of the right-to-farm act;151 zero 
reported cases include citations to the right-to-farm amendment.152 In 
Missouri, only one reported cases includes citations to the right-to-farm 
act;153 only one reported case includes citations to the right-to-farm 
                                                 
149 See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01-42-04-05 (2015); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29; MO. 
REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000); MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
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amendment.154 If the right-to-farm acts were barely used and rarely 
litigated, why bother creating more expansive right-to-farm amendments? 
Right-to-farm amendments are unnecessary, overly broad, and do 
not allow for necessary exceptions. Right-to-farm acts are more detailed 
and easier to adapt to the needs of a specific state. Although few farmers 
appear to have taken advantage of either, right-to-farm acts are superior to 
right-to-farm amendments in protecting farms and farmers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Schultz Family Farms, LLC v. Jackson City shows the necessity of 
legislative exceptions to right-to-farm laws. As demonstrated in Schultz, 
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act made such an exception easy. The Act 
included a specific rationale for creating the Schultz exception; this 
rationale is also likely to work for other, similar exceptions that become 
necessary in the future. State right-to-farm acts have been around for 
decades, but the recent trend toward adding right-to-farm amendments to 
state constitutions will make it harder to create necessary exceptions. 
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Additionally, right-to-farm amendments might protect large farmers at the 
expense of the small family farmers who helped make America what it is 
today. Because right-to-farm acts have worked so well for so long, states 
should not enact stricter, harder-to-adapt right-to-farm amendments. 
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